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Abstract 
We study the impact of different regulatory and ownership regimes on the dividend policy of 
regulated firms. Using a panel of 106 publicly traded European electric utilities in the period 
1986-2010, we link payout and smoothing decisions to the implementation of different 
regulatory mechanisms (cost plus vs. incentive regulation) and to firm ownership (state vs. 
private). After controlling for the potential endogeneity of the regulatory mechanism, our 
results show that utilities subject to incentive regulation smooth their dividends less than firms 
subject to cost-based regulation and present higher impact effects and target payout ratios. 
This suggests that when managers are more sensitive to competition-like efficiency pressures 
following the adoption of incentive regulation, they adopt a dividend policy more responsive 
to earnings variability and more consistent with optimal cash management.  These results, 
however, apply only to private utilities. If the state still has ultimate control, smoothing of 
dividends remains irrespective of the regulatory mechanism. It seems that corporate 
governance (i.e. state control) trumps regulation when it comes to dividend payout policy. 
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1. Introduction 
One of the most important financial decisions that a firm’s managers face is on the amount 
and stability of dividends. Dividends have always been a bit of a puzzle in the theory of the 
firm. In the neoclassical world of Miller and Modigliani (1961) ‘‘dividends do not matter’’ 
which is to say that they drop out as a pure residual, once the optimal level of investment has 
been determined. Moreover, dividend smoothing is even more suspect: if one thought of 
dividends from the view of optimal cash flow management, one might expect them to be 
highly volatile.  When profits are high, firms invest more and pay out large dividends.  When 
profits are low, they cut dividends to maintain working capital.  In the long run average 
dividend payments would be proportional to average profits, but in the short run they would 
bounce around.  Thus, from the point of view of cash management, dividend smoothing –
since costly - is a puzzle.   
 In his seminal study, Lintner (1956) noticed that managers are particularly concerned 
with the stability of dividends. Half a century later, managers still appear to believe strongly 
that the market puts a premium on firms with a stable dividend policy (Brav et al. 2005). 
There have been many explanations of this observation including risk aversion on the part of 
investors, lack of investment opportunities or signalling theories (Black, 1976). Recently, a 
literature evolved explaining dividend smoothing by agency cost explanations, i.e. dividend 
policy as a consequence of the separation of ownership and control (Easterbrook, 1984 and, 
for comprehensive empirical evidence, Leary and Michaely, 2011). Agency theory predicts 
substantial and stable dividends. The higher dividends are, the less free cash flow there is, 
ceteris paribus, in managers’ hands to spend on negative net present value projects. The 
higher dividends are, the greater is also the need to go to the capital market for new outside 
funds, and the greater the effectiveness of monitoring. If the primary function of dividends is 
to force firms into the capital market, regular and stable payouts are more valuable. 
Fudenberg and Tirole (1995) explain income and dividend smoothing based on incumbency 
rents. If managers enjoy private benefits from being in control, they, individually and 
rationally, smooth dividends. In bad times, they pay out too much dividends to lengthen their 
tenure. In good times, they are less concerned by their short-term prospects and information 
decay allows them to save for future bad times. Finally, La Porta et al. (2000) conjecture that 
minority shareholders press corporate insiders to pay dividends, since they cannot be sure to 
get a fair return particularly in countries where shareholder rights are not well developed. 
Consistent with an agency cost explanation of dividend smoothing, Gugler (2003) finds that 
target dividend levels, the smoothing of dividends, and the reluctance to cut dividends depend 
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on the identity of the (ultimately) controlling owner. State-controlled firms engage in dividend 
smoothing and have the highest target payout ratios while, in marked contrast, dividend 
payments of family-controlled firms are not subject to dividend smoothing. Furthermore, 
state-controlled firms are most reluctant to cut dividends while family-controlled firms are 
least reluctant to cut dividends. More recently, Michaely and Roberts (2012), finding that 
privately owned firms smooth dividends and payout less than their publicly listed 
counterparts, suggest that the scrutiny of public capital markets, ownership structure and 
incentives altogether play key roles in shaping firm dividend policy. 
 In this paper we conjecture that there is still another factor that comes into play when 
we look at the dividend policy of large firms: regulation. When looking at public utility 
services, the state has two options to provide those services. First, the state himself can 
provide the services and own the assets so involved. Second, the state can privatise the 
companies providing these services and regulation accompanies this process: to prevent the 
abuse of natural monopoly positions, regulatory authorities are usually established that subject 
the utilities to regulation. An interesting hybrid construct is the partially state-owned company 
subject to regulation. The question that arises with such constructs is whether effective 
regulation can be expected if the state both owns part of the assets and sets up the regulatory 
framework. We analyse such set-ups in the electricity industry. In particular, we compare the 
dividend policy of firms that are partly owned by the state and subject to regulation with firms 
that are fully private and subject to regulation. 
These firms are not only key for national economies in terms of aggregate investment 
(Guthrie, 2006) and market capitalisation (Bortolotti, Cambini and Rondi, 2013), they are also 
remarkable because of their generous dividend payments. A recent report by J.P. Morgan 
(2011) shows that telecom and electric utilities have been the highest-paying industries in the 
U.S. in the last years. Dividend payout, i.e. the ratio between dividends and net income, is 
118% for telecoms and 56% in utilities, while dividend yield, i.e. annual dividends per share 
divided by the share price, is 5.3% for the telecom industry and 4.5% for the other utilities, 
which are the highest values among all sectors. 
These firms are subject to regulatory oversight, a feature that most of the times has set 
them apart when studying dividend policy, the common explanation being that their dividend 
behaviour does not reconcile with current textbook explanations because regulated sectors are 
less risky, insulated from product and even capital markets’ discipline and where regulators 
directly or indirectly may influence how much dividend they can pay. For example Moyer, 
Chatfield and Sisneros (1989) find that security analysts’ monitoring activities are lower when 
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the firm is a public utility. In general, the finance literature that examined the dividend 
behaviour of regulated firms focused on the role that dividend payouts play in the monitoring 
process to reduce equity agency costs within capital markets (Miller, 1986; Smith, 1986; and 
Hansen, Kumar and Shome, 1994).  
The aim of this paper is to study regulated firms’ dividend policy with a new 
perspective that investigates whether different types of regulatory contracts can influence 
firms’ smoothing and payout decisions. To this purpose, we examine how firms respond to 
changes in regulatory mechanisms that are aimed at enhancing their efficiency as well as at 
shaking their “quite life”. Since the European energy sector has been subject to significant 
regulatory and privatisation reforms, we use a large sample of European electric utilities from 
1986 to 2010 to link their dividend behaviour to the implementation of new regulatory 
mechanisms, allowing for potential influences of their ownership status. Moreover, this paper 
also departs from the previous literature in that we account for the potential endogeneity of 
the regulatory policy.  
 Over the last thirty years, the EU energy sector underwent many reforms, mainly 
aimed at liberalising the market and at privatising the state-owned monopolies. The main 
purpose was (and still is) to raise firm efficiency and to improve the quality of service. While 
electric generation is already almost fully liberalised (and de-regulated) as well as privatised 
in most EU countries, transmission and distribution services are still subject to regulation 
either by independent regulatory agencies or by executive-branch commissions, and many 
transmission and distribution operators still remain partially (or fully) controlled by the state.5  
 Among market reforms that affect the provision of public utilities, the choice of the 
regulatory contracts is a key policy decision that in many countries has brought the 
implementation of modern regulatory mechanisms (Laffont, 1994): incentive regulation. 
Incentive regulation serves the purpose to raise the efficiency of energy utilities that had so far 
been regulated – both in the US and in Europe - through a cost-based regulatory mechanism. 
Mainly adopted to reduce managerial slack, these modern regulatory schemes are thought to 
provide powerful incentives to increase efficiency by leaving larger profits to the regulated 
operator. At the same time, earnings become more volatile and firms under incentive 
regulation are perceived to be riskier by the financial markets.6 
Starting from the classic Lintner model, we modify the standard partial adjustment 
specification to take into account the potential effect of a regulatory policy change on firms’ 
                                                 
5 For an overview of the regulatory and privatisation reforms in the European electric sector, see Cambini, Rondi 
and Spiegel (2012). 
6 See the surveys by Armstrong and Sappington (2006 and 2007) and Joskow (2007). 
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dividend behaviour. We argue that, under cost-based regulation, the regulated price moves 
with ex post costs which is why the firm has more stable cash flows, whereas under incentive 
regulation profits mostly depend on the firm’s ability to achieve efficiency gains; hence firms 
are the “residual” claimants. The pressure to increase efficiency is stronger under incentive 
than under cost-based regulation, which should drive the behaviour of incentive regulated 
firms to smooth their dividends less than firms under cost-based regulation. Dividend flows 
are therefore likely to be more stable for firms under cost-based than under incentive 
regulation. 
The reluctance of the national governments to release control and ownership of energy 
incumbents may be, in part, related to the reluctance to abandon the large dividend rights that 
accrue to the state as the main shareholder. Especially when the budget constraint tightens (as 
in the recent years in all Western economies), the “energy dividend” becomes a more or less 
safe and steady source of financing. Our next research question therefore asks whether the 
firm’s ownership structure may also affect the dividend policy of electric utilities. We argue 
that the reasons why ownership is expected to matter for regulated firms’ dividend policy are 
not only related to the classical agency problem as developed by Gugler (2003) or Michaely 
and Roberts, 2012), but also to government and political interference in utilities’ real and 
financial decisions (Shleifer and Vishny, 1994; Shleifer, 1998; Bennedsen, 2000; and, for an 
empirical test on European firms, Bortolotti, Cambini and Rondi, 2013). 
 Our results show that, consistent with our theoretical model, the dividend behaviour of 
incentive and cost-based regulated utilities differs significantly. Throughout most 
specifications and econometric methods, electric utilities under incentive regulation are found 
to exhibit lower smoothing parameters and higher impact effects. Moreover, higher target 
payout ratios for incentive regulated firms are found in all GMM specifications. However, 
these results are only valid when the firms are privately controlled. In marked contrast, 
partially-state owned firms actually display larger smoothing of dividends when incentive 
regulation is introduced, while impact effects are unaltered, compared to state-controlled 
firms under cost-based regulation. This leads to a rise in target payout ratios for state-
controlled firms under incentive regulation. These results suggest that incentive regulation 
transfers more risk to regulated firms, making their managers more sensitive to competition-
like efficiency pressures, hence more likely to cut dividends when necessary, when also 
control is privatised. If control remains in state-hands, the effects of regulatory reform differ, 
at least with respect to dividend policy. 
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 To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first systematic analysis of the 
interrelation between regulation, ownership and dividend payout policy. The outline of the 
paper is the following. In Section 2 we present the dividend model of smoothing and payout 
extended to account for regulatory regimes and we describe our estimation strategy. Section 3 
describes the changing pattern of the regulatory framework in the European energy market, 
the sample and the data we use for the estimations. In Section 4 we present the main results. 
Section 5 summarises and concludes. 
 
2. Research Design and Estimation Strategy 
2.1 A Model of Dividend Policy for Regulated Firms  
 
We start by assuming that firms set their dividend payout policy according to the partial 
adjustment model of Lintner (1956). Following the Lintner Model, dividends are the result of 
a partial adjustment of last year’s dividends towards a target payout ratio. In more details, for 
any year t, the target level of dividends, *itD  for firm i, is related to the current earnings, itE , 
through a desired payout ratio τi: 
 
itiit ED τ=*          (1) 
 
In any given year the firm will only partially adjust their dividend policy towards the 
target dividend level. Hence, it results: 
 
itititiiitit uDDaDD +−+=− −− )( 1*1 α      (2) 
 
where 1−− itit DD  is the actual change in the dividend, ai is a constant, αi measures the speed 
of adjustment and lies between zero and one, and 1
* −− itit DD  is the desired change in the 
dividend. The closer αi is to one, the faster the speed of adjustment is. (1 - αi) is called the 
Smoothing parameter, and τi is the Target Payout Ratio parameter, which gives the optimal 
percentage of profits for distribution via dividends. The constant term ai is generally positive 
and it reflects the greater reluctance to reducing vis-à-vis raising dividends, which is 
commonly observed. Finally, uit represents the discrepancy between the observed change and 
that expected on the basis of the model. The adjustment process can be rewritten as: 
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ititiitiiiit uDEaD +−++= −1)1( ατα      (3) 
 
where i iα τ , the coefficient on current earnings, is called the “impact effect”. This 
leads to the following empirically testable equation:  
 
itititiit uDEaD +++= −121 ββ       (4) 
 
and computation of the three parameters of interest, smoothing, impact effect and target 
payout ratio, as follows: 
 
1
2 1
2
 1    ;   ; 
1i i i i
βα β τ α β τ β− = = = −      (5) 
 
Recent empirical analyses on dividend policy show that dividend smoothing is highly 
affected by earnings volatility and company risk. In particular, Leary and Michaely (2011) 
empirically find that firms with high earnings and cash flow volatility, and therefore more 
risk, tend to smooth less. We directly incorporate this empirical evidence in our setting 
modifying the measure of the speed of adjustment in the following way: 
 
(1 )i i iα α σ= +  
 
where αi is again the standard measure of the speed of adjustment, and σi is a measure of the 
earnings volatility of firm i. This assumes that the speed of adjustment increases as long as 
earnings volatility rises, and implies that we can rewrite Equation (2) as follows: 
 
itititiiitit uDDaDD +−+=− −− )( 1*1 α   
 
with itiit ED τ=* . This leads to the following: 
 
1(1 ) (1 (1 ))it i i i i it i i it itD a E D uα σ τ α σ −= + + + − + +  
 
This implies that the “adjusted” smoothing parameter becomes: 
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2
ˆ 1 (1 )  i iα σ β− + = .       (6) 
 
Condition (6) shows that higher earnings volatility leads to a smaller smoothing 
parameter, in line with evidence by Leary and Michealy (2011). 
We believe that this approach is particularly important in explaining dividend 
decisions in regulated utilities where earnings volatility is strongly correlated with the kind of 
regulatory contracts firms are subject to. The different contractual regimes adopted to regulate 
utilities all over the world range from the standard low powered incentives/cost-based 
mechanism – such as the rate of return regulation - to the more recent incentive regulatory 
schemes - such as the revenue or price cap mechanisms (see Laffont, 1994; Armstrong and 
Sappington, 2006 and 2007). To this aim, it is important to recall the scope and the effect of 
the introduction of different contractual types on firm performance.  
The most famous cost-based regulatory mechanism is known as the rate of return 
regulation, whereby regulators fix the rate of return the utility can earn on its assets. With this 
form of contract, the regulators set the price the utility can charge so as to cover all main 
operating costs and to allow it to earn a specified rate of return. The regulated price can then 
be adjusted upward (downward) if the firm starts making a lower (higher) rate of return. In 
turn, this implies that this pricing scheme not only does not boost firm efficiency but it also 
reduces earnings volatility and guarantees financial integrity of the regulated firm (Armstrong 
and Sappington, 2006; Joskow, 2007). 
Contrary to the standard cost-based mechanism, the purpose of incentive regulation is 
to encourage efficiency gains. By pursuing cost savings, managers can generate higher profits 
and thus benefit shareholders. However, incentive schemes change over time and are 
generally revised periodically by national regulators to avoid the regulated company to earn 
supernormal profits. This implies that the firms can maintain high profits only if the 
management succeeds in seeking out further cost savings. Incentive regulation7 may thus 
leave excess profits to the regulated operator, if the firm is able to meet the incentives set by 
the regulators constantly over time; but its adoption also shifts the risk of demand or cost 
fluctuations on the firm, increasing therefore the variability of the company earnings. Indeed, 
empirical evidence shows that on average the adoption of incentive mechanisms not only 
                                                 
7 Incentive regulation is usually implemented as price- or revenue-cap mechanisms or benchmarking 
(Littlechild, 1983), through the application of fixed-price contracts (Armstrong and Sappington, 2007). 
Sappington (2002) is a comprehensive survey of incentive regulation mechanisms and instruments. Joskow 
(2008) surveys incentive regulation schemes as adopted in the energy industry.  
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leads to higher productivity but also to higher net profits (Ai and Sappington, 2002), higher 
volatility in earnings (Parker, 1997)8 and higher systematic risk (Alexander and Irwin, 1996; 
Grout and Zalewska, 2006) than the standard low-powered incentive cost-based mechanism.  
From the above analysis, we therefore have the following testable hypothesis: 
 
H1 (Dividend Smoothing): Firms under Incentive Regulation have 
lower smoothing parameters than firms under Cost-Based regulation. 
 
Thus, we argue that, under cost-based regulation, the regulated price moves with ex 
post costs which is why the firm has more stable cash flows, whereas under incentive 
regulation, profits mostly depend on the firm’s ability to achieve efficiency gains; hence firms 
are the “residual” claimants. Dividend flows are therefore likely to be more stable for firms 
under cost-based than under incentive regulation. The pressure to increase efficiency is 
stronger under incentive regulation than under cost-based, which should drive the behaviour 
of incentive regulated firms to smooth their dividends less than firms under cost-based 
regulation. 
 However, there is one big qualification to this hypothesis, namely whether continuing 
state-control counteracts the efficiency effects of incentive regulation. Elected politicians are 
held accountable for all of the activities of government. They can be expected to have a 
particularly strong interest in seeing a steady flow of dividends from a company controlled by 
the state, since (1) dividends may suffice to convince citizens that the company is performing 
well, and (2) a steady stream of dividends reduces the cash flow in the hands of the managers 
(see Gugler, 2003). (3) The reluctance of the national governments to release control and 
ownership of energy incumbents may be, in part, related to the reluctance to abandon the large 
dividend rights that accrue to the state as the main shareholder.9 Especially when the budget 
constraint tightens (as in the recent years in all Western economies), the “energy dividend” 
becomes a safe and steady source of financing.  
Our next research question therefore asks whether the firm’s ownership structure may 
also affect the dividend policy of electric utilities. In particular, we expect that state-controlled 
firms continue to smooth their dividends despite of incentive regulation, since politicians 
                                                 
8 Parker (1997) shows that after the introduction of incentive regulation profits of many UK utilities largely 
increase but they also start to fluctuate a lot both in the electricity and telecom sectors. On the contrary, in the 
gas industry the incumbent operator British Gas presented falling profits over time due to large restructuring 
costs and the excessive costs of the contracts for gas provision. 
9 There are several recent examples for this. Verbund, for example, a large Austrian electricity company left its 
dividend stable in 2011 despite a slight drop in profits (see Stock-Express.Com, 29 February, 2012). Verbund is 
51% state controlled. The management of Verbund aims at a “target 50% payout ratio”. 
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and/or controlling bureaucrats demand stable dividends. After all, (excessive) dividends, i.e. 
rent extraction from producers and/or consumers, represent a much more hidden way of 
increasing the funds available for politicians than direct taxation. 
If incentive regulation leads to larger efficiency pressure, cash management should 
(must) also be optimised. If profits are high, dividend payouts should be high, if profits are 
low, dividend payouts should be low. Moreover, note that according to Moyer et al. (1992) 
regulated utilities use dividend payouts as a strategic instrument to obtain more favourable 
conditions on retail prices from the regulator. Hence, utilities may use their earnings to 
distribute larger payouts to affect the regulatory policy.10 
We thus claim that the type of the regulatory contract also allows us to hypothesize on 
the impact effect. 
 
H2 (Impact Effect): Firms under Incentive Regulation have larger 
impact effect parameters than firms under Cost-Based regulation. 
 
 Again, this analysis is largely confined to private firms. If incentive regulation does 
not imply the same efficiency and/or strategic implications for state-controlled firms than for 
private firms, we would also not expect hypothesis 2 to hold for them. 
Previous studies (Moyer et al., 1992; Hansen et al., 1994) show that payout ratios of 
regulated utilities are typically higher than payout ratios for non-regulated industrial firms. 
According to these studies, regulatory oversight from national regulators insulates utility 
managers from the discipline of both the market for corporate control and the product market 
competition. However, while these factors help to explain why larger payout ratios are 
expected in utilities, they are not sufficient to explain the variation in dividend payouts across 
utilities.  
The hypothesised effects of incentive regulation on the target payout ratio are more 
subtle. On the one hand, incentive regulation should reduce dividend smoothing, leading to 
lower target payout ratios, on the other hand the increased efficiency and/or strategic 
pressures of incentive regulation should lead to larger impact effects, and thus to larger target 
payout ratios (see equations (5)). Thus, ex ante we cannot determine which effect is larger, 
and we leave this to the empirical analysis. While the same arguments may apply to state-
controlled companies, one may argue that their target payout ratios unambiguously increase 
under incentive regulation. The reasons are that the rents so extracted from producers and/or 
                                                 
10  This is in line with the strategic use of leverage already shown in previous studies (Daspupta and Nanda, 
1993; Bortolotti et al., 2011). 
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consumers are a more opaque way to increase funds for politicians than direct taxation, and, 
what is more, high and stable dividends may be taken as a signal that the state-controlled 
companies are performing well and increase efficiency under incentive regulation. 
2.2 Estimation Strategy 
 
The theoretical framework developed in the previous section provides the hypotheses 
to be tested by our econometric analyses. Estimation of the Lintner partial adjustment model 
using panel data raises a number of econometric problems that only recently have been 
explicitly addressed and accounted for (see for example, Andres et al., 2009, and Khan, 
2006). The first estimation problem is that the Net Profits (or Cash Flows) variable is likely to 
be correlated across firms with the firm-specific effect and that the lagged Dividends variable 
is most likely correlated with these firm-specific effects. To remove the firm-specific effect, 
the within-group estimator can be used, but then, because the fixed-effect transformation 
requires time-demeaning of all variables, the lagged dependent variable would remain 
correlated with the transformed disturbance term.  To obtain consistent estimators, we thus 
use the first-difference transformation to eliminate the fixed effect and then apply the linear 
generalised method of moments (GMM) estimator developed by Arellano and Bond (1991) 
and Arellano and Bover (1995). This estimator is especially designed for panel data models 
where the lagged dependent variable is included and some of the regressors are potentially 
endogenous and lagged values of the dependent variable can be used as instruments, provided 
there is no serial correlation in the disturbance. More specifically, we use the dynamic 
System-GMM estimator (Arellano and Bond, 1991, and Blundell and Bond, 1998), which 
deals with situations where the lagged dependent variable is persistent (i.e. the autoregressive 
parameter is large).11  
We modify the original Lintner model so as to allow for a change in dividend 
behaviour due to the regulatory regime, interacting both the lagged dividend and 
contemporaneous profits with a binary variable Inc Reg it, which is equal to 1 when the firm is 
                                                 
11 This model estimates a system of first-differenced and level equations and uses lags of variables in levels as 
instruments for equations in first-differences and lags of first-differenced variables as instruments for equations 
in levels, for which the instruments used must be orthogonal to the firm-specific effects.  For the validity of the 
GMM estimates it is crucial that the instruments are exogenous. We check that they are and report the 
appropriate tests: the Arellano and Bond (1991) autocorrelation tests to control for first-order and second-order 
correlation in the residuals, the two-step Sargan-Hansen statistic to test the joint validity of the instruments and 
the Difference-in-Hansen test of exogeneity of individual instruments to test the overidentifying restrictions for 
the external instruments. The Sargan-Hansen test is robust, but may be weakened if there are too many 
instruments with respect to the number of observations (see Roodman, 2006). Therefore, we follow a 
conservative strategy using no more than two lags of the instrumenting variables, so as to assure that the number 
of instruments is not greater than the number of firms. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and 
arbitrary patterns of autocorrelations within individuals.  
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regulated by an incentive mechanism (price- or revenue-cap, or benchmarking), and 0 when a 
cost-based regime is in place. The estimation equation is therefore: 
 
0 1 1 2 1 1 3 4it i i it i it it i it i it it itD a a D a D Inc Reg a E a E Inc Reg ε− − −= + + + + +   (7) 
 
A further econometric issue is the potential endogeneity of the regulatory contracts – 
low vs. high-powered incentive schemes - that is chosen by the regulator. Ideally, to deal with 
the endogeneity of the contract type within a static setting, we might use a standard 
instrumental variable estimator (as in Bortolotti, Cambini and Rondi, 2013, for a market-to-
book regression model), but the presence of the lagged dependent variable, and the need to 
deal with the dynamic panel bias, rules out the 2SLS approach.  Within the GMM framework 
we can also GMM-instrument the interacted Inc Reg, on the ground that the “contract type” is 
fundamentally a choice variable that arises through a process of bargaining between the 
regulator, the firms and eventually the government,12 where this bargaining process is 
influenced by the past performance (dividends and profits) of the firm (as in Wintoki, Linck 
and Netter, 2012). In addition, we can also count on external instruments and use a set of 
variables that account for domestic institutions and country specific features to instrument Inc 
Reg. For this purpose, we rely on characteristics that may influence the choice of a regulatory 
regime, and use country-specific, time-varying variables extensively used in the applied 
political economy literature and typically sourced from the World Bank database on Political 
Institutions (see Beck et al., 2001, for a detailed description of the variables). Herfindahl 
Gov., the Herfindahl Index Government, is the sum of the squared seat shares of all parties in 
the government and is expected to control for the internal cohesion of the executive hence the 
ability to make and enforce policy decisions.  ORIENTATION is a time-varying variable 
which accounts for the political orientation of the executive in charge; it is equal to 1 when 
the executive is rightwing, 2 when it is centre, and 3 when it is leftwing. STABILITY is a 
survey-based measure that captures the extent of turnover of a government's key decision 
makers in any year and ranges from 0 (high stability) to 1 (low stability). CHECKS is an 
index for checks and balances incorporated into a political system that ranges from 1 
(minimal checks) to 10 (maximal checks). 
                                                 
12 This view is consistent with the theoretical analysis by, for example, Besanko and Spulber (1992) and by 
anectodal evidence. In particular, according to the U.S. Supreme Court, the decision to adopt a specific 
regulatory contract “involves a balancing of the investor’s and the consumers’ interests” that should result in 
rates “within a range of reasonableness” (see Federal Power Comm. v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 603 
(1944)). 
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Finally, we include firm ownership, in the form of a dummy, State Control, which is 
equal to 1 when the government directly and/or indirectly holds at least 25% of the firm 
ownership, and has therefore ultimate control. This variable is original and manually 
constructed by the authors, as further detailed in the data section below. 
The role of firm ownership, and particularly state ownership, is multifaceted because it 
may be viewed as affecting both dividend (Gugler, 2003) and regulatory policies. We have 
noted that privatisation of transmission and distribution operators is far from complete and 
this reluctance to privatise for governments with tight budget constraints and rocketing debt-
to-GDP ratios may be attributed to the substantial dividends that these operators distribute. 
However, insofar as firm value is the present value of the stream of future dividends, the 
decisions whether to sell the firm now or to cash in the dividends forever only depends on the 
government’s preference for privatisation proceeds vis-à-vis an ongoing stream of dividends. 
Conversely, to the extent that the government can interfere with regulatory decisions (such as 
the choice of the regulatory institution or of the regulatory mechanism, down to setting the 
regulated rates) to obtain a more favourable treatment for state controlled firms that results in 
a large dividend payout, state ownership can be viewed a key determinant of regulation 
policy. Thus, eventually, state ownership potentially should matter for dividend policy both 
directly via state-control of the company and indirectly via regulatory policy. In a first step, 
therefore, we use State Control as an instrument for Inc Reg, thereafter we additionally 
include State Control as a direct determinant of dividend payout policy. 
To summarise we start by presenting the results from simple pooled-OLS regressions 
(with time dummies), and then proceed with fixed-effect estimates before turning to two sets 
of GMM-IV results. In the first set, in order to allow for the endogeneity of regulatory regime, 
we GMM instrument not only the lagged Dividends but also its interaction with Inc Reg; in 
the second one, we also account for the potential influence of domestic institutions on the 
choice of the regulatory policy and, accordingly, introduce a set of external instruments drawn 
from the recent political economy literature. In a last step, we look whether state control has 
also a direct effect on dividend payout policy. 
For robustness, we repeat the empirical strategy using Cash Flows instead of Net 
Profits as suggested by Fama and Babiak (1968) and recently adopted by Andres et al. (2009). 
Our panel includes firms from several countries with different and time-varying tax laws with 
respect to fixed assets depreciations (equipment write-offs and allowances for accelerated 
depreciations which may be relevant for capital intensive electric utilities) as well as to legal 
reserves. With this alternative approach we try to allow for dividend decisions that are not 
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based on published earnings only. Since results are very similar and robust, we confine the 
Cash Flow results to the appendix. 
 
3. Institutional Context, Data and Summary Statistics 
3.1. Institutional Context  
In the last decades, the European Commission issued several directives in order to prompt 
national reforms that redesigned the legal and regulatory framework in the public utility 
sector, and in particular in the electricity industry. While until the early nineties, public 
utilities in Europe, with the only UK exception, were characterized by vertical integration, 
state monopoly and public ownership, the aim of such reforms was to raise efficiency, 
improve service quality, and spur infrastructure investment through the introduction of 
liberalization, privatization and new regulatory interventions.  
 Directive 96/92/EC built the basis for this significant reform of the European 
electricity market. Its main aim was to open national electricity markets and to prepare an 
integrated electricity market in Europe. The directive contained common rules for electricity 
generation, transmission and distribution, in order to induce convergence in production and in 
market structures in single member states. In addition to that, monopolistic (transmission and 
distribution) and potential competitive markets (generation and retail) were distinguished and 
member states were required to establish independent transmission grids. Directive 
2003/54/EC, the acceleration guideline, required complete opening of national electricity 
markets by July 1st, 2007. Moreover, legal unbundling and an independent national regulatory 
authority were demanded for the first time. The third energy package, Directive 2009/72/EC, 
further increased the unbundling requirements. Member countries can now choose between 
three different unbundling models: ownership unbundling, an independent system operator or 
an independent transmission operator. Although the effects of the different unbundling 
methods are still discussed, most European countries already switched to ownership 
unbundling.  
According to the EU legislator, privatisation and liberalisation should enhance 
efficiency and competition, reduce the consumer’s dependency on few large suppliers and 
increase security of supply. With reference to firm ownership energy enterprises, the 
European Union encouraged member states’ governments to shift from the classical vertically 
integrated and state-controlled set-up towards unbundling and (at least partial) privatisation. 
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However, the EU Commission left the ultimate decision about utilities’ ownership entirely in 
the hands of national governments. As of 2012, privatization of public utilities within EU 
member states is far from complete, and central and local governments still hold majority and 
minority ownership stakes in many regulated utilities, particularly in Austria, France, Finland, 
Germany and Italy.  
Concerning the regulatory framework for setting trasmission and distribution charges 
most of the European countries (except for the UK) initially started with a cost-based 
regulation. Nevertheless, switching to some kind of incentive regulation has been part of most 
regulatory reform processes worldwide (Vogelsang, 2002; Cambini and Rondi, 2010). The 
EU Directives did not impose any mandatory rule on the form of regulatory schemes, 
delegating the choice of the most appropriate regime to each national regulatory agency. For 
this reason, the regulatory mechanisms differ across countries and across market segments. 
They range from the typical cost-plus (mainly, rate of return) to incentive-based schemes, 
either in the form of price or revenues caps or through benchmarking (yardstick) competition. 
Within the electricity sector, the UK adopted incentive mechanisms in the early nineties in 
both distribution and transmission, while other countries - like Belgium, Hungary, Italy, Spain 
and Norway – switched later from rate of return to incentive based pricing in both segments. 
Austria, Denmark, Finland and Sweden shifted to incentive schemes only in distribution, 
Greece and France still rely only on cost-plus mechanisms while Germany switched to 
incentive regulation in 2010. 
Figure 1 presents a timeline indicating the first introduction of incentive regulation in 
the electricity market (for distribution, transmission or both) of several European countries. 
 
Figure 1: Timeline of the Introduction of Incentive Regulation 
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3.2 Data and Summary Statistics 
 
The starting point of our sample creation were all firms listed in Worldscope, with a primary 
or secondary SIC code equal to 4911 “Electric services”.13 We reviewed the selected sample 
by checking all included firms by hand and eliminating the ones which are mainly operating 
in different fields, like conglomerates or investment trusts. Subsequently, we created a 
dummy indicating whether the firms operate in distribution, transmission or production of 
electricity. We dropped all firms that are exclusively operating in electricity production, 
because these firms are not subject to regulation.  
 Finally, we obtain an unbalanced panel sample consisting of 106 firms operating in the 
European14 electricity market in the period of 1986 to 2010. We use total common and 
preferred dividends paid to shareholders as dividend variable Dividends. For current earnings 
we use two different proxies: net income after preferred dividends for Net Profits of the firms 
and net profits plus depreciation, depletion and amortisation for Cash Flows of the firm (see 
the appendix). All variables are recorded in US$, see Table 1 for definitions of all variables 
used. 
 To describe the regulatory regime the firms are facing, we constructed a dummy for 
incentive regulation (Inc Reg). This dummy contains a one if either transmission or 
distribution operates under incentive regulation, zero otherwise. The incentive regulation 
dummy is on the one hand used to create interaction terms with the main explanatory 
variables current earnings and lagged dividends and on the other hand for sub-sampling. 
Concerning the ownership data we constructed a dummy (State Control), indicating at least 
25% state ownership. This threshold was chosen because 25% of shares establish a blocking 
minority in most European countries, which enables the owner to control important, strategic 
decisions of the enterprise. In creating the dummy we took the following procedure: If the 
state (governments at federal, state and local level) holds 25% or more of the shares of a firm, 
the dummy contains a one, zero otherwise. If a so state-controlled firm holds the majority of 
shares of another firm, this second firm is also marked as state-controlled. In that, direct and 
ultimate state ownership are considered. The necessary information was mainly collected 
from the homepages and annual reports of the firms.  
                                                 
13 If a sales breakdown for segments is available SIC Code 1 would represent the business segment which 
provided the most revenue, and SIC Code 2 the second most. If a sales breakdown is not available the SIC Code 
is assigned according to the best judgment of Worldscope (Worldscope Database – Datatype Definitions Guide). 
14 Included countries: Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, Italy, Luxembourg, Norway, 
Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom.   
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Table 2 summarises descriptive statistics of all variables included in the regression 
analysis for the full sample (Panel A), highlights the yearly development of Inc Reg and State 
Control (Panel B), and presents means and mean difference tests in the variables between the 
different regulatory regimes (Panel C).  
As reported in Panel A, firms pay on average around 230 Mio USD in Dividends out 
of Net Profits of 384 Mio USD (and Cash Flows of around 900 Mio USD). Around 33% of 
firm-years operate under incentive regulatory schemes, while 67% under cost-based type 
regimes. However, over time 74 out of the 106 firms face a regulatory regime switch from 
cost-based to incentive regulation. The average country in the sample locates around the 
centre of the political spectrum (mean Orientation of 2.05), enjoys broad internal cohesion in 
government (mean Herfindahl Gov. of 0.66), with a Checks average of around 4.19 (out of a 
maximum of 10), and faces political stability (mean Stability of 0.14). More than half of the 
firm-years (56.5%) are under state control, and over time 28 out of the 106 firms face a switch 
in State Control. 
A comparison of incentive versus cost-based regulated firms is particularly revealing 
(see panel C). Interestingly, if there is cost-based regulation in place, the percentage of 
companies still ultimately controlled by the state is much higher (68.7%) than if incentive 
regulation is in place (34.8%). Moreover, over time, incentive regulation gains and cost-based 
regulation looses importance, while the state gradually withdraws from control over time (see 
Panel B). This is a first indication that regulation and ownership/control are related.  
3.3. Profitability, Dividends and Volatility across Regulatory Regimes  
Our theoretical framework highlights the impact of earnings (profitability) variability and firm 
risk on dividend smoothing, while hinting at the potential differences of returns volatility for 
utilities operating under cost-based or incentive regulation. Thus, before turning to the 
estimation of the modified Lintner dividend model, we present evidence of firm heterogeneity 
of the level and variability of profitability and dividend payout across regulatory regimes (for 
a similar approach see for example Leary and Michaely, 2011, and Michaely and Roberts, 
2012 and, specifically on regulated electric utilities, Hansen et al. 1994). We use Net 
Profits/Total Assets, Cash Flows/Total Assets, EBITDA/Total Assets (Return on Assets or 
ROA) and Net Profits/Equity (Return on Equity or ROE) as profitability measures and, to 
gauge dividend policy, we use both Dividend/Net Profits and Dividend/Cash Flows as 
measures of payout and Dividend/Total Assets as an alternative normalisation for dividends. 
In the lower part of Table 2, Panel C, we use the standard deviations of these variables to 
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measure their volatility. Finally, to further document the differences in return variability (and 
firm risk), we include a comparison for Price Volatility, which is a measure of a stock's 
average annual price movement to a high and low from a mean price for each year. Figures 2-
4 visually track the evolution over time of selected variables by regulatory regime. 
 Table 2, Panel C highlights the following differences between the sub-samples of 
incentive versus cost-based regulation. First, as already mentioned, the state is much more 
important as a controlling shareholder for cost-based regulated firms than for incentive 
regulated firms. Second, whether we measure them using Net Profits, Cash Flows or Ebitda, 
we find that firms under incentive regulation exhibit significantly higher profitability ratios 
than firms under cost-based regulation. This is consistent with the efficiency enhancing 
pressures of incentive regulation we hypothesized in the theory section. Third, the picture is a 
bit more nuanced with respect to dividend payout ratios. While Dividends as a share of Net 
Profits are (insignificantly) lower for incentive regulated firms (53.7%) than for cost-based 
regulated firms (55.4%),15 firms under incentive regulation pay out significantly larger shares 
as a percentage of Total Assets and Cash Flows. Thus, again consistent with our theoretical 
priors, the effects of incentive regulation on the dividend payout ratio are not clear-cut, since 
both lower smoothing but higher impact effects may be present at the same time. Finally, all 
comparisons of standard deviations of our profitability and dividend measures indicate, that 
the volatility of profitability and dividends goes up with the introduction of incentive 
regulation. We also find that stock price volatility, a market based proxy for firm risk, is also 
(significantly) higher for incentive regulated firms. The graphical evidence is in line with the 
mean differences tests. Figure 2 shows that profitability of incentive regulated firms as 
measured by the Return to Asset tend to be both higher and more volatile. This pattern is 
confirmed by Figure 3, which maps Dividend to Total Asset, and by Figure 4 where we graph 
Price Volatility.  
Summarising, both the level and variability of profitability go up after the introduction 
of incentive regulation. This is consistent with efficiency enhancing pressures and firm 
riskiness going up due to becoming a “residual claimant” under incentive regulation. While 
this translates into a dividend policy, that is significantly more volatile whenever the firm is 
under incentive regulation, the dividend payout ratio does not necessarily go up. Thus, to 
ultimately judge the effects of incentive regulation one needs to look at the time profile of 
dividend payout policy, which we do below by estimating the Lintner model. 
                                                 
15 Of course, the absolute amounts of dividends are higher under incentive regulation, since profits are so much 
higher. 
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4. Results  
4.1. The Lintner Dividend Model for Regulated Firms   
 
As our unbalanced panel data set comprises different firms as well as varying time 
spans between 1986 and 2010, panel regression techniques have to be used to account for the 
characteristics of longitudinal data. We concentrate on estimating the pure Lintner Model, not 
accounting for other firm-differences (like size or tax differences between countries), which 
might be correlated with dividend payouts. Therefore, fixed effects (FE) specifications are 
theoretically more convincing than random effects specifications for estimating the Lintner 
Model.  Moreover, as discussed in Section 3, the own past of dividend payouts is an important 
aspect of the Lintner Model for representing the adjustment process towards the target payout 
ratio. Including a lagged dependent variable may lead to biased estimates within the usual 
fixed effects panel framework. Consequently, although we report for comparison, pooled-
OLS and FE estimates, we focus our presentation of results on the system GMM estimator.  
As a starting point, Table 3 reports the results for the full sample (Equation [4]), Table 
5 allows for the differential impact of incentive vs. cost-based regulatory regimes by 
estimating the unrestricted model in Equation [7], while Table 4 reports the results of a 
regression analysis of the determinants of the choice of the regulatory mechanism (our quasi-
first stage analysis). For all tables we quantify and report the corresponding model 
parameters: the coefficients of dividend smoothing (S), the impact effects (I) and the 
estimated target payout ratios (Tpr).   
Table 3 shows estimation results for the whole unbalanced panel, where the 
coefficients on lagged Dividends and contemporaneous Net Profits are not interacted with the 
incentive regulation dummy. We note that the coefficient on the lagged dividend, (1-αi), i.e. 
the coefficient of dividend smoothing, varies from 0.379 (FE) to 0.475 (GMM), thus the 
speed of adjustment (αi) ranges between 0.525 and 0.621. Impact effects are estimated of 
ranging between 0.172 (GMM) and 0.306 (OLS), thus target payout ratios range between 
0.327 (GMM) and 0.560 (OLS) (Table 3a). All estimated coefficients are significant at the 1% 
level of significance. As noted above, GMM estimates a system of first-differenced and level 
equations and uses lags of variables in levels as instruments for equations in first-differences 
and lags of first-differenced variables as instruments for equations in levels, for which the 
instruments used must be orthogonal to the firm-specific effects. Thus, for the validity of the 
GMM estimates it is crucial that the instruments are exogenous. Indeed, the autocorrelation 
tests for second-order correlation in the residuals, the two-step Sargan-Hansen statistic to test 
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the joint validity of the instruments, and the Difference-in-Hansen test of exogeneity of 
individual instruments to test the overidentifying restrictions for the external instruments all 
suggest that our estimates are valid. Table A4 in the appendix reports the results when we use 
Cash Flows instead of Net Profits, and we find very similar results. 
Before turning to the results from the unrestricted model that tests for the differences 
across regulatory regimes, Table 4 reports the results of regressions of Inc Reg on the set of 
external instruments used in the GMM regression of Table 5 (a “quasi first stage”). As 
explained in Section 3.2, the instruments are chosen among features of the domestic political 
institutions and the importance of state control in the industry, both of which may influence 
the choice of the regulatory regime. Because all institution variables vary only at the country-
year level, we estimate these regressions at the country-year level, and accordingly the 
number of observations goes down from the previous table. To deal with state control, we 
average State Control over all the electric utilities of each country and year, and thus 
Mean_State Control measures the percentage of companies under state control in each year in 
a given country in the electricity industry. In Table 4 we present the regression results for a 
within-group (fixed effects) model, a Logit model, and for a Logit regression estimated for the 
sub-sample of countries that report a switch in the regulatory regime from cost-based to 
incentive regulation. This “quasi” first stage analysis confirms our priors that 
ownership/control of the state and domestic political institutions play a significant role in 
affecting the choice of the regulatory regime. Incentive regulation schemes are less likely 
when state control of electric utilities is more pervasive and the government executive in 
charge is more leftwing. Moreover, incentive regulation appears to be more likely instituted 
when the parties in government are more unified and concentrated. No clear-cut results are 
obtained with institutional checks and balances (switching signs across specifications) and our 
political stability measure (insignificant). 
We now turn to the key issue of this paper.  Our prediction on the differing dividend 
behaviour of regulated firms according to the regulatory regime can be evaluated on the basis 
of Table 5. To recall, both the lagged Dividends and the Net Profits are interacted with Inc 
Reg, which is 1 when the firm is under incentive regulation (price or revenue-cap), and 0 
when under cost-based regulation. The results show that the interacted Dividends terms 
(Dividends*Inc Reg) always carry a negative sign and are significant in columns (3) and (4), 
where the appropriate GMM estimator is used (in the OLS and fixed effects estimates of 
columns (1) and (2) the coefficients on the lagged Dividends terms are downwardly biased). 
The coefficients are similar whether or not we include the external instruments. Thus, we find 
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clear evidence that the past level of dividends has a higher impact on this year’s dividends for 
cost-based regulated utilities than for incentive regulated firms. Moreover, for the GMM 
regressions the coefficients on the Net Profits (Net Profits* Inc Reg) interaction terms enter 
significantly with positive signs. As predicted by our theoretical framework, therefore, 
dividend smoothing is less prevalent and impact effects are higher for firms that are subject to 
a regulatory scheme that encourages efficiency gains. Table 5a shows that for the GMM 
regressions the resulting target payout ratios are higher for incentive regulated firms than for 
cost-based regulated utilities, thus the increase in the impact effects outweighs the drop in 
dividend smoothing. Corresponding tests confirm a significant difference of the target payout 
ratios in the GMM specifications. Table A5 in the appendix reports the results when we use 
Cash Flows instead of Net Profits, and again we find very similar results. 
Summarising, our results of a higher speed of adjustment and impact effects for 
incentive regulated firms confirm that these firms are less reluctant to cut dividends when 
necessary, and suggest that incentive regulatory schemes lead firms to a dividend policy more 
responsive to earnings variability and more consistent with efficiency-enhancing pressures. In 
addition, we find that, particularly in the columns reporting the consistent GMM estimates, 
the target payout ratios for incentive regulated firms tend to be higher than those of cost-based 
regulated firms.   
 
4.2. Dividend Policy of Regulated Firms: Does Ownership Matter? 
The first stage analysis in Table 4 has drawn our attention to the role of state control 
for the choice of the regulatory regime, and this may call into question whether, after all, 
ultimate state control may also directly influence the dividend policy of the regulated firms 
(see Gugler 2003, for example). Now, we take a further step and explore whether government 
control may cause the dividend policy to differ within different regulatory regimes.  
As discussed in Section 3.2, the reluctance of national governments to release control 
and ownership of energy incumbents may be, in part, related to the reluctance to abandon the 
large dividend rights that accrue to the state as the main shareholder. In particular, one may 
postulate that politicians could exert their influence and demand high and stable dividends, 
even when the firm is subject to incentive regulation (which we have found to reduce 
dividend smoothing on average for all firms), to obtain funds for their purposes without the 
need to directly tax their electorate.  
In Table 6 we report a set of statistics and mean difference t-tests similar to Table 2, 
but differentiating by state control as well as by regulatory regime. We note that private firms 
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tend to be more profitable when they are under incentive regulation than under cost-based 
regulation, but that the same cannot be said for state controlled firms, corroborating our prior 
that incentive regulation does not entail the same efficiency pressures for firms when they 
remain under state control than when they are privatised. The picture from dividend payout 
ratios is less straightforward. Private firms seem to pay lower dividends under Incentive 
regulation than under cost-based regulation when we look at Dividends/ Net Profits, but more 
when looking at Dividends/ Cash Flows or Dividends/ Total Assets. This contrasts to state 
controlled firms which unambiguously display larger dividend payout ratios under incentive 
regulation than under cost-based regulation. 
In Table 7 we present the regression results introducing the four-way interactions into 
the Lintner model – Inc State, Inc Private, and Cost Private with Cost State as the base 
category. Although we can rely on a large enough sample, the precision of the estimates from 
this four-way distinction goes down. Since the instrument count soars (see Roodman, 2006, 
for a warning about the problem of too many instruments) due to the many lagged dividend 
interactions, we also present a set of results where we deliberately do not GMM instrument 
the interacted terms (see column 5). Comfortingly, we find that the results remain similar. 
The regression results in Table 7 suggest that the dividend policy, and particularly the 
smoothing behaviour, is significantly different between state and private utilities, even when 
they are subject to the same regulatory regime. The strongest result is undoubtedly that the 
lower smoothing parameters we had registered for utilities under incentive regulation appear 
to be completely due to private firms, while state firms continue to smooth dividends 
regardless of the regulatory regime.16 Table 7a points out that smoothing parameters for 
private firms operating under incentive regulation are very low and insignificant in all 
specifications. Thus, we find some evidence that private firms under incentive regulation even 
stop targeting dividends at all and exclusively link dividend policy to current earnings. 
Together with the results on impact effects, which are not significantly different from each 
other, we obtain consistent evidence for the conjecture that state firms are seen as a source of 
stable dividends by the government, irrespective of the regulatory regime. 
Overall the results suggest that the response to incentive regulation is dampened when 
the firm is partially owned by the state. Thus, the state appears to find ways to not only 
indirectly influence dividend payout policy via determining regulatory policy, but also to 
directly influence dividend policy via state control of the utility. 
                                                 
16 The results with Cash Flows instead of Net Profits are similar, in that they show that private firms under 
incentive regulation tend to smooth significantly less, but also provide some evidence of lower smoothing for 
private firms under cost-based  regulation (see Table A6 in the appendix). 
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5. Conclusion  
 
Regulated firms, and among them electric utilities, generally distribute very generous 
dividends to their shareholders. Notwithstanding this, dividend policy in regulated firms 
attracted little attention by the existing literature. We argue that this neglect is misplaced, 
since regulated industries provide a rich testing ground for theories of the firm, such as the 
relation of regulation and ownership, and the effects on key corporate finance decisions like 
the dividend pay-out decision.  
The aim of this paper is to shed light on these issues via estimating the Lintner model 
of dividends for an unbalanced panel of 106 firms from seventeen European countries 
operating in the regulated segments of the electricity market (distribution and transmission). 
We unearth important differences in the dividend payout policy, i.e. the smoothing of 
dividends, impact effects and target payout ratios, of companies subject to different  
regulatory (incentive vs. non incentive) and corporate governance (state vs. private control) 
regimes. The observed time span ranges from 1986 to 2010 and covers a period of deep 
market reforms for the European energy sector. 
We first extend the partial adjustment “behavioural” model by Lintner (1956) to take 
into account of the potential effect of a regulatory regime change on firms’ earnings and their 
variability. We then test our predictions with our original dataset, allowing for the dynamic 
panel data bias as well as for the potential endogeneity of incentive regulation. Our results 
show that dividend smoothing, impact effects and therefore target payout ratios are sensible to 
the regulatory regime companies face. We find that electric utilities subject to incentive 
regulation smooth their dividends less and respond more readily to profit changes than those 
subject to cost-based regulation. This implies that incentive regulation leads dividend policy 
to be more responsive to earnings variability and more consistent with efficiency-enhancing 
pressures. These results are confirmed when we also account for the potential endogeneity of 
the regulatory mechanism, when we use cash flows instead of net profits and when we 
conduct sub-samples’ analyses. 
The lower smoothing of dividends under incentive regulation is entirely due to private 
firms, however. We find even some evidence that private firms operating under incentive 
regulation stop targeting dividends at all and exclusively link current dividends to current 
earnings. In contrast to that, state controlled (i.e. partially state owned) firms continue to 
smooth their dividends, despite moving from cost-based to incentive regulation. One reason 
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may be that obtaining excessive and stable dividends is a more hidden way to enforce political 
preferences than direct taxation. 
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Figure 2 – Return on Assets (Ebitda/Total Assets) 
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Figure 3 – Dividends/Total Assets 
 
0
0,01
0,02
0,03
0,04
0,05
0,06
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Incentive Reg Cost plus
 
 
Figure 4 – Price Volatility 
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Table 1: Variable definitions and sources 
Variable Name Source Definition 
Dividends Worldscope Total common and preferred dividends paid to shareholders of the company 
(1000 U.S.$). 
Net Profits Worldscope Net income after preferred dividends that the company uses to calculate its 
basic earnings per share (1000 U.S.$). 
Dividend Payout Ratio  Actual dividend payout ratio, computed as dpr=Dividends/Net Profits. 
Cash Flows Worldscope Net Profit plus depreciation, depletion and amortisation (1000 U.S.$). 
Total Assets Worldscope Total assets of the company (1000 U.S.$).  
Total Liabilities Worldscope All short and long term obligations (1000 U.S.$). 
Ebitda Worldscope Earnings before interest, taxes and depreciation (1000 U.S.$). 
Market Capitalisation Worldscope Total market value of the company based on year end price and number of 
shares outstanding (1000 U.S.$). 
Tobin’s Q  Computed with variables from Worldscope as  
Tobin’s Q=(Market Capitalisation +Total Liabilities)/ Total Assets. 
Leverage  Computed with variables from Worldscope as  
Leverage = Total Liabilities/ Total Assets. 
Price Volatility Worldscope A measure of a stock's average annual price movement to a high and low 
from a mean price for each year. 
Inc Reg  Regulatory 
Authorities 
Self-constructed dummy, indicating whether the firm is operating under 
incentive regulation (1) or not (0).  
State Control Annual 
Reports 
Self-constructed dummy, indicating at least 25% state ownership (direct and 
ultimate). 
Mean_State Control  Computed as the yearly mean of the State Control dummy by nation. 
Orientation DPI2009 A time-varying variable which accounts for the political orientation of the 
executive in charge: (1) for rightwing, (2) for centre and (3) for leftwing. 
Herfindahl Gov. DPI2009 Herfindahl Index Government: The sum of the squared seat shares of all 
parties in the government. 
Stability DPI2009 A survey-based measure that captures the extent of turnover of a 
government's key decision makers in any year and ranges from (0) high 
stability to (1) low stability. 
Checks DPI2009 An index for checks and balances incorporated into a political system that 
ranges from (1) minimal checks to (10) maximal checks. 
Note: DPI2009 stands for Database of Political Institutions, World Bank 
 
 31
Table 2 – Descriptive statistics - (106 electric utilities, period 1986-2010) 
 
Panel A: Full Sample 
      
 Mean sd Min Max Obs. 
Political Institutions      
Orientation 2.048 0.932 1.00 3.00 356 
Herfindahl Gov. 0.658 0.274 0.18 1.00 384 
Stability 0.138 0.272 0.00 1.00 383 
Checks 4.185 1.399 1.00 10.00 384 
Firm Characteristics      
Inc Reg  0.327 0.469 0.00 1.00 2650 
State Control 0.565 0.496 0.00 1.00 2027 
Log_ Total Assets 14.613 2.026 6.75 19.65 1580 
Tobin’s Q 1.300 0.563 0.35 5.99 1425 
Leverage 0.573 0.186 0.00 1.15 1580 
Profitability      
Net Profits (abs.) 384351.929 1042573.029 -2723518.50 12028613.00 1579 
Cash Flows (abs.) 905844.745 2011819.163 -2162773.00 17316560.00 1572 
Net Profits/ Total Assets 0.041 0.047 -0.55 0.35 1578 
Cash Flows/ Total Assets 0.087 0.051 -0.54 0.38 1571 
Net Profits/ Equity 0.114 0.110 -0.83 0.91 1566 
Ebitda/ Total Assets 0.120 0.059 -0.53 0.52 1567 
Dividends      
Dividends (abs.) 229028.942 677984.611 0.00 8945529.00 1537 
Dividends/ Total Assets 0.022 0.028 0.00 0.41 1537 
Dividends/ Net Profits 0.549 0.434 0.00 3.76 1480 
Dividends/Cash Flows 0.238 0.207 0.00 1.30 1501 
Price Volatility 18.270 6.516 0.00 43.43 914 
N.Firms [N. Obs.] 106 [2650]     
Note: The section Political Institution refers to a nation-year basis. 
 
Panel B: Time Structure of Inc Reg and State Control 
   
 Inc Reg State Control 
1986 13.21% 77.46% 
1987 13.21% 76.06% 
1988 13.21% 75.00% 
1989 13.21% 75.00% 
1990 13.21% 61.33% 
1991 13.21% 61.33% 
1992 13.21% 60.53% 
1993 13.21% 58.97% 
1994 13.21% 56.25% 
1995 13.21% 54.22% 
1996 13.21% 55.43% 
1997 23.58% 54.95% 
1998 23.58% 52.69% 
1999 24.53% 53.76% 
2000 33.02% 52.17% 
2001 33.02% 54.02% 
2002 44.34% 54.02% 
2003 50.94% 53.41% 
2004 50.94% 52.81% 
2005 58.49% 51.90% 
2006 61.32% 45.45% 
2007 61.32% 45.45% 
2008 61.32% 46.75% 
2009 62.26% 47.37% 
2010 83.02% 47.37% 
Note: Percentages refer to firms under incentive regulation and state control over the total of included firms respectively. 
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Panel C: Firms under Incentive vs. Cost-Based Regulation 
  Mean Comparison  
 Incentive  Cost 
Political Institutions    
Orientation 1.905 ~ 2.052 
Herfindahl Gov. 0.716 > *** 0.625 
Stability 0.158 ~ 0.139 
Checks 4.071 ~ 4.246 
Firm Characteristics    
Inc Reg  1.000 . 0.000 
State Control 0.348 < *** 0.687 
Log_ Total Assets 15.158 > *** 14.373 
Tobin’s Q 1.305 ~ 1.297 
Leverage 0.561 < * 0.579 
Profitability    
Net Profits (abs.) 602547.445 > *** 288481.156 
Cash Flows (abs.) 1108115.881 > *** 816667.461 
Net Profits/ Total Assets 0.055 > *** 0.034 
Cash Flows/ Total Assets 0.095 > *** 0.083 
Net Profits/ Equity 0.142 > *** 0.101 
Ebitda/ Total Assets 0.131 > *** 0.115 
Dividends    
Dividends (abs.) 391809.302 > *** 157545.806 
Dividends/ Total Assets 0.031 > *** 0.018 
Dividends/ Net Profits 0.537 ~ 0.554 
Dividends/ Cash Flows 0.287 > *** 0.217 
Volatility: Profitability    
sd_Net Profits/ Total Assets 0.032 > * 0.024 
sd_Cash Flows/ Total Assets 0.033 ~ 0.026 
sd_Net Profits/ Equity 0.074 ~ 0.061 
sd_Ebitda/ Total Assets 0.039 ~ 0.032 
Price Volatility 21.196 > *** 16.545 
Volatility: Dividends    
sd_Dividends/ Total Assets 0.022 > *** 0.010 
sd_Dividends/ Net Profits 0.352 > * 0.284 
sd_Dividends/ Cash Flows 0.164 > *** 0.106 
N.Firms [N. Obs.] 88 [866]  92 [1784] 
Note: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01; The prefix sd inVolatility refers to the standard deviation of the single variables 
computed as firm averages; Mean difference tests in the section Political Institutions were computed on a nation-year basis.  
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Table 3 - Main Results - Full Sample 
 
 OLS FE GMM 
Dep. Var.: Dividends t    
Dividends t-1 0.454*** 0.379*** 0.475*** 
 (0.129) (0.125) (0.119) 
    
Net Profits 0.306*** 0.289*** 0.172*** 
 (0.0565) (0.0516) (0.0403) 
Instruments 1st difference equation   
Standard    
GMM-type   Dividends t-2 
Net Profits t-1 
Instruments level equation   
Standard   Constant 
GMM-type   Dividends t-1 
Net Profits 
N.Firms [N.Obs.] 106 [1417] 106 [1417] 106 [1417] 
R2 0.736 0.604  
adj. R2 0.732 0.596  
AIC 40337.9 40246.7 . 
sarganp   0.000 
hansenp   0.117 
ar1p   0.0107 
ar2p   0.313 
j   94 
Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01; hansenp represents the p-value of the Hansen test of overid. 
restrictions; sarganp represents the p-value of the Sargan test of overid. restrictions; ar1p and ar2p represent the p-values of 
the autocorrelation tests of order 1 and 2 respectively; Note that year dummies were included in all presented specifications. 
 
 
 
 
Table 3a: Smoothing (S), Impact (I) and Target Payout Ratio (Tpr) 
 OLS FE GMM 
S 0.454*** 0.379*** 0.475*** 
I 0.306*** 0.289*** 0.172*** 
Tpr 0.560*** 0.465*** 0.327*** 
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Table 4: First Stage Regressions- Dependent Variable: Inc Reg 
 FE Logit Logit 
Sub-sample that switches 
from Cost to Inc 
    
Mean_State Control t-1 -0.236*** -3.521*** -3.769*** 
 (0.0823) (0.426) (1.033) 
    
Herfindahl Gov. t-1 0.0695 3.285*** 0.375 
 (0.120) (0.835) (1.188) 
    
Checks t-1 0.0332* -0.114 -0.321 
 (0.0177) (0.121) (0.215) 
    
Orientation t-1 -0.0508*** -0.155 -0.528** 
 (0.0192) (0.199) (0.232) 
    
Stability t-1 -0.0340 -0.231 -0.222 
 (0.0596) (0.609) (0.650) 
    
N 380 380 195 
R2 0.657   
adj. R2 0.612   
AIC 186.3 322.3 141.3 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table 5: The impact of incentive regulation 
 
 OLS FE GMM GMM(extern) 
Dep. Var.: Dividends t     
Dividends t-1 0.543*** 0.506*** 0.663*** 0.661*** 
 (0.0815) (0.0844) (0.188) (0.185) 
     
Dividends t-1*Inc Reg t-1 -0.171 -0.232 -0.497* -0.508* 
 (0.201) (0.193) (0.263) (0.276) 
     
Net Profits  0.266*** 0.247*** 0.144 0.130 
 (0.0395) (0.0439) (0.0891) (0.0897) 
     
Net Profits *Inc Reg 0.0831 0.0690 0.312*** 0.333*** 
 (0.0715) (0.0655) (0.117) (0.128) 
Instruments 1st 
difference equation 
    
Standard   NP t-1 
NP t-2 
NP * Inc Reg t-1 
NP * Inc Reg t-2 
NP t-1 
NP t-2 
NP *Inc Reg t-1 
NP * Inc Reg t-2 
Orientation t-1 
Herfindahl Gov. t-1 
State Control t-1 
Stability t-1 
GMM-type   Dividends t-2 
Dividends* Inc Reg t-2 
Dividends t-2 
Dividends* Inc Reg t-2 
Instruments level 
equation 
    
Standard   NP t-1 
NP t-2 
NP * Inc Reg t-1 
NP * Inc Reg t-2 
NP t-1 
NP t-2 
NP * Inc Reg t-1 
NP * Inc Reg t-2 
Orientation t-1 
Herfindahl Gov. t-1 
State Control t-1 
Stability t-1 
GMM-type   Dividends t-1 
Dividends* Inc Reg t-1 
Dividends t-1 
Dividends* Inc Reg t-1 
N.Firms [N.Obs.] 106 [1417] 106 [1417] 106 [1323] 96 [1103] 
R2 0.740 0.613   
adj. R2 0.735 0.605   
AIC 40323.3 40218.1 . . 
sarganp   0.000 0.000 
hansenp   0.151 0.316 
ar1p   0.0124 0.0117 
ar2p   0.390 0.371 
j   85 89 
Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01; hansenp represents the p-value of the Hansen test of overid. 
restrictions; sarganp represents the p-value of the Sargan test of overid. restrictions; ar1p and ar2p represent the p-values of 
the autocorrelation tests of order 1 and 2 respectively; GMM refers to the “system GMM” and “extern” indicates the use of 
external instruments; Note that year dummies were included in all presented specifications. 
 
 
Table 5a: Smoothing (S), Impact (I) and Target Payout Ratio (Tpr) 
 OLS FE GMM GMM(extern) 
 Inc Cost Inc Cost Inc Cost Inc Cost 
S 0.372* 0.543*** 0.273 0.506*** 0.166 0.663*** 0.152 0.661*** 
I 0.349*** 0.266*** 0.316*** 0.247*** 0.456*** 0.144 0.464*** 0.130 
Tpr 0.555*** 0.581*** 0.435*** 0.499*** 0.547*** 0.428*** 0.547*** 0.384*** 
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Table 6: Profitability and dividend behaviour across regulation and control 
 
 Cost Incentive 
 State  Private State  Private 
Profitability       
0.035 ~ 0.034 0.043 < *** 0.064 Net Profits/ Total Assets 
(0.037)  (0.046) (0.059)  (0.058) 
0.086 > *** 0.078 0.085 < *** 0.102 Cash Flows/ Total Assets 
(0.042)  (0.050) (0.062)  (0.060) 
0.101 ~ 0.101 0.105 < *** 0.170 Net Profits/ Equity 
(0.089)  (0.097) (0.084)  (0.157) 
0.116 ~ 0.113 0.116 < *** 0.142 Ebitda/  Total Assets 
(0.054)  (0.055) (0.064)  (0.071) 
Dividends       
0.017 < *** 0.022 0.028 ~ 0.033 Dividends/ Total Assets 
(0.020)  (0.022) (0.032)  (0.043) 
0.526 < *** 0.618 0.619 > *** 0.481 Dividends/ Net Profits 
(0.397)  (0.401) (0.528)  (0.489) 
0.199 < *** 0.263 0.301 ~ 0.278 Dividends/ Cash Flows 
(0.193)  (0.188) (0.226)  (0.238) 
17.219 > * 16.145 21.951 > ** 20.529 Price Volatility 
(6.329)  (6.996) (5.570)  (4.791) 
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, Significance is reported according to mean difference tests on firm-year 
observations, Standard deviation in parentheses 
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Table 7: The impact of regulation and control 
 
Dep. Var.: Dividends t OLS FE GMM GMM(extern) GMM(few_inst) 
      
      
Dividends t-1 0.585*** 0.557*** 0.388*** 0.363*** 0.495** 
 (0.0455) (0.121) (0.0766) (0.0728) (0.208) 
      
Div t-1*Inc t-1 * State t-1 0.163** 0.126 0.253** 0.288*** 0.259 
 (0.0659) (0.145) (0.118) (0.112) (0.272) 
      
Divt-1*Inc t-1 * Priv t-1 -0.453*** -0.498*** -0.336*** -0.306** -0.389** 
 (0.0585) (0.140) (0.130) (0.127) (0.178) 
      
Divt-1*RoRt-1*Privt-1 -0.0598 -0.103 0.0667 0.0915 0.138 
 (0.0628) (0.201) (0.166) (0.171) (0.204) 
      
Net Profits 0.241*** 0.215*** 0.304*** 0.326*** 0.254** 
 (0.0268) (0.0459) (0.0441) (0.0431) (0.126) 
      
Net Profits *Inc * State -0.0503 -0.0597 -0.0424 -0.0665 -0.0256 
 (0.0449) (0.0621) (0.0658) (0.0648) (0.212) 
      
Net Profits *Inc * Priv 0.153*** 0.120 0.121 0.0979 0.112 
 (0.0349) (0.0950) (0.0932) (0.0922) (0.148) 
      
Net Profits* RoR* Priv -0.0158 -0.0319 -0.0576 -0.0743 -0.0301 
 (0.0343) (0.0724) (0.0790) (0.0779) (0.119) 
Instruments 1st diff. equation     
Standard   NPt-2 
NPt-2 *Inc t-2 * State t-2 
NPt-2 *Inc t-2 * Priv t-2 
NPt-2*RoR t-2 *Privt-2 
 
NP t-2 
NP t-2*Inc t-2 * State t-2 
NP t-2*Inc t-2 * Priv.t-2 
NP t-2 * RoR t-2 * Privt-2 
Orientation t-1 
Herfindahl Gov. t-1 
Stability t-1 
Orientation t-1 
Herfindahl Gov. t-1 
Stability t-1 
NP t-2 *Inc t-2 * State t-2 
NP t-2 *Inc t-2 *Privt-2 
NP t-2 * RoRt-2 * Privt-2 
Div t-2*Inc t-2 * State t-2 
Divt-2*Inc t-2 * Priv t-2 
Div t-2* RoR t-2 * Privt-2 
GMM-type   Divt-2 
Div t-2*Inc t-2 *Statet-2 
Div t-2*Inc t-2 * Privt-2 
Div t-2*RoRt-2 *Privt-2 
Divt-2 
Div t-2*Inc t-2 * State t-2 
Div t-2*Inc t-2 * Priv t-2 
Divt-2*RoR t-2 *Privt-2 
NP t-2 
Divt-3 
Instruments level equation     
Standard   NP t-2 
NPt-2*Inc t-2 *State t-2 
NP t-2*Inc t-2 * Priv t-2 
NP t-2*RoRt-2* Privt-2 
 
NP t-2 
NP t-2 *Inc t-2 * State t-2 
NP t-2 *Inc t-2 * Privt-2 
NP t-2 * Cost t-2 * Privt-2 
Orientation t-1 
Herfindahl Gov. t-1 
Stability t-1 
Orientation t-1 
Herfindahl Gov. t-1 
Stability t-1 
NP t-2 *Inc t-2 * State t-2 
NP t-2 *Inc t-2 * Privt-2 
NP t-2 * Cost t-2 * 
Private t-2 
Div t-2*Inc t-2 * State t-2 
Divt-2*Inc t-2 * Priv t-2 
Div t-2RoR t-2 * Privt-2 
GMM-type   Divt-1 
Div t-1*Inc t-1* State t-1 
Div t-1*Inc t-1 *Priv t-2 
Divt-1* RoRt-1 *Prit-1 
Div t-1 
Div t-1*Inc t-1* State t-1 
Div t-1*Inc t-1 * Private t-2 
Divs t-1* Cost t-1 * Priv t-1 
Net Profits t-1 
Dividends t-2 
N.Firms [N.Obs.] 106 [1358] 106 [1358] 106 [1263] 96 [1095] 96 [1074] 
R2 0.760 0.597    
adj. R2 0.754 0.588    
AIC 38483.8 38386.8 . . . 
Sarganp   0.000 0.000 0.000 
Hansenp   0.999 1.000 0.394 
ar1p   0.0435 0.0389 0.0166 
ar2p   0.226 0.125 0.0580 
J   159 162 99 
Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01; hansenp represents the p-value of the Hansen test of overid. 
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restrictions; sarganp represents the p-value of the Sargan test of overid. restrictions; ar1p and ar2p represent the p-values of 
the autocorrelation tests of order 1 and 2 respectively; GMM refers to the “system GMM”, “extern” indicates the use of 
external instruments and “few_inst” the use of fewer instruments; “Dividends*Inc*State” refers to the interaction term 
between Dividends, a dummy indicating that Inc Reg is equal 1 and a dummy indicating that State Control is equal 1; 
“Dividends*Inc*Private” refers to the interaction term between Dividends, a dummy indicating that Inc Reg is equal 1 and a 
dummy indicating that State Control is equal 0; “Dividends* Cost *Private” refers to the interaction term between Dividends, 
a dummy indicating that Inc Reg is equal 0 and a dummy indicating that State Control is equal 0; “Net Profits*Inc*State” 
refers to the interaction term between Net Profits, a dummy indicating that Inc Reg is equal 1 and a dummy indicating that 
State Control is equal 1; “Net Profits*Inc*Private” refers to the interaction term between Net Profits, a dummy indicating that 
Inc Reg is equal 1 and a dummy indicating that State Control is equal 0; “Net Profits* Cost *Private” refers to the interaction 
term between Net Profits, a dummy indicating that Inc Reg is equal 0 and a dummy indicating that State Control is equal 0;  
Note that year dummies were included in all presented specifications. 
 
 
Table 7a: Smoothing (S), Impact (I) and Target Payout Ratio (Tpr) 
 
 GMM GMM(extern) 
 State Private State Private 
 Inc Cost Inc Cost Inc Cost Inc Cost 
S 0.642*** 0.388*** 0.0524 0.455*** 0.651*** 0.363*** 0.0571 0.455*** 
I 0.261*** 0.304*** 0.425*** 0.246*** 0.260*** 0.326*** 0.424*** 0.252*** 
Tpr 0.729*** 0.496*** 0.448*** 0.452*** 0.745*** 0.512*** 0.450*** 0.462*** 
 
 GMM(few_inst) 
 State Private 
 Inc Cost Inc Cost 
S 0.754*** 0.495** 0.106 0.633*** 
I 0.229** 0.254** 0.366** 0.224*** 
Tpr 0.930*** 0.504*** 0.410*** 0.612*** 
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Appendix 
 
Table A1: - Panel Structure 
Available 
Observations 
Number of Firms % Cumm. % 
6 4 3.77 3.77 
7 12 11.32 15.09 
8 6 5.66 20.75 
9 7 6.60 27.36 
10 5 4.72 32.08 
11 12 11.32 43.40 
12 3 2.83 46.23 
13 4 3.77 50.00 
14 3 2.83 52.83 
15 11 10.38 63.21 
16 4 3.77 66.98 
17 2 1.89 68.87 
18 2 1.89 70.75 
19 2 1.89 72.64 
20 5 4.72 77.36 
21 3 2.83 80.19 
22 2 1.89 82.08 
23 5 4.72 86.79 
24 3 2.83 89.62 
25 11 10.38 100.00 
N 106   
 
Table A2: Dividend Payout Ratios (Descriptive Statistics for Nations) 
Nation Firms Observations Mean Median Std. Deviation 
Austria 4 79 54.72% 38.95% 39.47% 
Belgium 4 56 67.82% 74.68% 32.45% 
Czech Republic 12 107 34.05% 24.68% 42.97% 
Denmark 2 25 38.52% 34.26% 28.70% 
Finland 3 50 58.62% 40.22% 55.10% 
France 5 100 33.05% 30.65% 35.34% 
Germany 22 305 67.10% 63.96% 37.13% 
Greece 1 10 44.60% 29.22% 47.80% 
Hungary 3 28 61.58% 80.08% 61.47% 
Italy 9 112 63.51% 57.28% 60.73% 
Luxembourg 1 20 62.02% 67.51% 15.39% 
Norway 3 49 33.61% 24.12% 39.00% 
Portugal 2 22 70.00% 67.58% 25.99% 
Spain 8 137 59.92% 56.64% 31.91% 
Sweden 3 35 55.51% 43.85% 32.05% 
Switzerland 10 188 58.96% 52.33% 38.56% 
UK 14 159 43.79% 32.62% 50.28% 
Total 106 1,482 54.86% 49.63% 43.35% 
Note: Presented data refer to the variable Dividend Payout Ratio. 
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Table A3 - First Stage Analysis: Pairwise correlations 
 
 Reg Inc 
Mean_State 
Control 
Herfindahl 
Gov. Checks Orientation Stability 
Reg Inc 1      
Mean_State Control -0.395*** 1     
Herfindahl Gov. 0.172*** 0.167*** 1    
Checks -0.061 -0.162*** -0.386*** 1   
Orientation -0.071 0.176*** 0.307*** -0.188*** 1  
Stability -0.012 0.043 0.092* -0.029 0.002 1 
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Cash flow results 
 
Table A4: Main Results - Full Sample Cash Flows 
Dep. Var.: Dividends t OLS FE GMM 
    
Dividends t-1 0.507*** 0.316** 0.395*** 
 (0.141) (0.134) (0.132) 
    
Cash Flows 0.140*** 0.236*** 0.117*** 
 (0.0439) (0.0427) (0.0260) 
Instruments 1st difference equation   
Standard    
GMM-type   Dividends t-2 
Cash Flows t-1 
Instruments level equation   
Standard   Constant 
GMM-type   Dividends t-1 
Cash Flows 
    
N.Firms [N.Obs.] 106 [1413] 106 [1413] 106 [1413] 
R2 0.728 0.626  
adj. R2 0.723 0.619  
AIC 40270.9 40055.3 . 
sarganp   0.000 
hansenp   0.0852 
ar1p   0.0128 
ar2p   0.342 
j   94 
Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01; hansenp represents the p-value of the Hansen 
test of overid. restrictions; sarganp represents the p-value of the Sargan test of overid. restrictions; ar1p and ar2p 
represent the p-values of the autocorrelation tests of order 1 and 2 respectively; Note that year dummies were 
included in all presented specifications. 
 
 
Table A4a: Smoothing (S), Impact (I) and Tpr - Cash Flows 
 OLS FE GMM 
S 0.507*** 0.316** 0.395*** 
I 0.140*** 0.236*** 0.117*** 
Tpr 0.283*** 0.346*** 0.193*** 
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Table A5: The impact of incentive regulation – Cash Flows 
 
Dep. Var.: Dividends t OLS FE GMM GMM(extern) 
     
Dividends t-1 0.580*** 0.408*** 0.555*** 0.521** 
 (0.107) (0.0699) (0.211) (0.212) 
     
Dividends* Inc Reg t-1 -0.262 -0.180 -0.469** -0.456* 
 (0.199) (0.167) (0.230) (0.237) 
     
Cash Flows 0.113*** 0.207*** 0.0907** 0.0976** 
 (0.0317) (0.0276) (0.0442) (0.0474) 
     
Cash Flows* Inc Reg 0.113** 0.0546 0.195*** 0.206*** 
 (0.0565) (0.0403) (0.0602) (0.0610) 
Instruments 1st 
difference equation 
    
Standard   Cash Flows t-1 
Cash Flows t-2 
Cash Flows * Inc Reg t-1 
Cash Flows * Inc Reg t-2 
 
Cash Flows t-1 
Cash Flows t-2 
Cash Flows * Inc Reg t-1 
Cash Flows *Inc Reg t-2 
Orientation t-1 
Herfindahl Gov. t-1 
State Control t-1 
 
GMM-type   Dividends t-2 
Dividends*Inc Reg t-2 
Dividends t-2 
Dividends*Inc Reg t-2 
 
Instruments level 
equation 
    
Standard   Cash Flows t-1 
Cash Flows t-2 
Cash Flows *Inc Reg t-1 
Cash Flows *Inc Reg t-2 
Cash Flows t-1 
Cash Flows t-2 
Cash Flows *Inc Reg t-1 
Cash Flows *Inc Reg t-2 
Orientation t-1 
Herfindahl Gov. t-1 
State Control t-1 
 
GMM-type   Dividends t-1 
Dividends*Inc Reg t-1 
Dividends t-1 
Dividends*Inc Reg t-1 
 
N.Firms [N.Obs.] 106 [1413] 106 [1413] 106 [1314] 96 [1094] 
R2 0.742 0.632   
adj. R2 0.737 0.625   
AIC 40201.1 40036.9 . . 
sarganp   0.000 0.000 
hansenp   0.158 0.231 
ar1p   0.00775 0.00739 
ar2p   0.395 0.394 
j   85 89 
Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01; hansenp represents the p-value of the Hansen test of overid. 
restrictions; sarganp represents the p-value of the Sargan test of overid. restrictions; ar1p and ar2p represent the p-values of 
the autocorrelation tests of order 1 and 2 respectively; GMM refers to the “system GMM” and “extern” indicates the use of 
external instruments. Year dummies were included in all presented specifications. 
 
 
Table A5a: Smoothing (S), Impact (I) and Target Payout Ratio (Tpr) - Cash Flows 
 OLS FE GMM GMM(extern) 
 Inc Cost Inc Cost Inc Cost Inc Cost 
S 0.318* 0.580*** 0.228 0.408*** 0.0858 0.555*** 0.0651 0.521** 
I 0.226*** 0.113*** 0.261*** 0.207*** 0.286*** 0.0907** 0.303*** 0.0976** 
Tpr 0.331*** 0.269*** 0.338*** 0.349*** 0.313*** 0.204*** 0.324*** 0.204*** 
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Table A6: The impact of regulation and control - Cash Flows 
 OLS FE GMM GMM(extern) GMM(few_inst) 
Dep. Var.: Dividends t      
      
Dividends t-1 0.664*** 0.505*** 0.348*** 0.343*** 0.541*** 
 (0.0409) (0.0921) (0.0918) (0.0868) (0.143) 
      
Dividends t-1*Inc t-1 * State t-1 0.0419 0.146 0.199* 0.234* -0.0406 
 (0.0613) (0.113) (0.119) (0.123) (0.280) 
      
Dividends t-1*Inc t-1 * Private t-1 -0.617*** -0.511*** -0.393*** -0.413*** -0.623*** 
 (0.0549) (0.108) (0.132) (0.120) (0.209) 
      
Dividends t-1* Cost t-1 * Private t-1 -0.363*** -0.197 -0.175 -0.238 -0.305 
 (0.0621) (0.172) (0.169) (0.162) (0.247) 
      
Cash Flows 0.0699*** 0.146*** 0.106*** 0.106*** 0.0708** 
 (0.00882) (0.0213) (0.0204) (0.0194) (0.0277) 
      
Cash Flows *Inc * State 0.0495** -0.00598 0.0781*** 0.0649** 0.149 
 (0.0208) (0.0243) (0.0263) (0.0275) (0.141) 
      
Cash Flows *Inc * Private 0.222*** 0.142*** 0.222*** 0.236*** 0.271*** 
 (0.0171) (0.0528) (0.0525) (0.0456) (0.0884) 
      
Cash Flows * Cost * Private 0.134*** 0.0836* 0.137*** 0.159*** 0.184*** 
 (0.0166) (0.0497) (0.0394) (0.0342) (0.0650) 
Instruments 1st difference equation     
Standard   CF t-2 
CFt-2*Inc t-2* State t-2 
CFt-2*Inc t-2 * Privt-2 
CF t-2*RoR t-2*Privt-2 
 
CF t-2 
CF t-2 *Inc t-2 * State t-2 
CFt-2 *Inc t-2 * Priv t-2 
CFt-2*Cost t-2 *Priv t-2 
Orientation t-1 
Herfindahl Gov.t-1 
Stability t-1 
Orientation t-1 
Herfindahl Gov. t-1 
Stability t-1 
CFt-2*Inc t-2*Statet-2 
CFt-2*Inc t-2 * Privt-2 
CFt-2*Cost t-2*Privt-2 
Div t-2*Inc t-2 *Statet-2 
Divt-2*Inc t-2 * Privt-2 
Divt-2*Cost t-2 * Privt-2 
GMM-type   Divt-2 
Div t-2*Inct-2 *State -2 
Divt-2*Inc t-2 * Privt-2 
Divt-2* Cost t-2 * 
Privt-2 
Divt-2 
Divt-2*Inct-2* State t-2 
Divt-2*Inc t-2 * Privt-2 
Divt-2*Cost t-2 * Privt-2 
CFlt-2 
Divt-3 
Instruments level equation      
Standard   CF t-2 
CF t-2*Inc t-2*State t-2 
CF t-2 *Inc t-2*Priv t-2 
CF t-2*RoRt-2*Priv t-2 
 
CF t-2 
CF t-2 *Inc t-2 * State t-2 
CF t-2 *Inc t-2 * Privt-2 
CF t-2 *RoR t-2 *Priv t-2 
Orientation t-1 
Herfindahl Govt-1 
Stability t-1 
Orientation t-1 
Herfindahl Gov. t-1 
Stability t-1 
CF t-2 *Inc t-2 * State t-2 
CF t-2*Inc t-2 * Private t-2 
CF t-2*Rort-2 * Privt-2 
Divt-2*Inc t-2 *State t-2 
Div t-2*Inc t-2 * Privt-2 
Divt-2*Rort-2 *Privt-2 
GMM-type   Div t-1 
Div t-1*Inct-1*State t-1 
Divt-1*Inc t-1 * Privt-2 
Div t-1*RoRt-1 *Privt-1 
Divt-1 
Divt-1*Inct-1*State t-1 
Divt-1*Inc t-1 * Privt-2 
Divt-1*RoRt-1 * Privt-1 
CF t-1 
Divt-2 
N.Firms [N.Obs.] 106 [1354] 106 [1354] 106 [1255] 96 [1087] 96 [1068] 
R2 0.774 0.618    
adj. R2 0.768 0.609    
AIC 38295.7 38206.1 . . . 
sarganp   0.000 0.000 0.000 
hansenp   0.997 1.000 0.195 
ar1p   0.0396 0.0520 0.0297 
ar2p   0.146 0.180 0.300 
J   159 162 99 
Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01; hansenp represents the p-value of the Hansen test of overid. 
restrictions; sarganp represents the p-value of the Sargan test of overid. restrictions; ar1p and ar2p represent the p-values of 
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the autocorrelation tests of order 1 and 2 respectively; GMM refers to the “system GMM”, “extern” indicates the use of 
external instruments and “few_inst” the use of fewer instruments; “Dividends*Inc*State” refers to the interaction term 
between Dividends, a dummy indicating that Inc Reg is equal 1 and a dummy indicating that State Control is equal 1; 
“Dividends*Inc*Private” refers to the interaction term between Dividends, a dummy indicating that Inc Reg is equal 1 and a 
dummy indicating that State Control is equal 0; “Dividends* Cost *Private” refers to the interaction term between Dividends, 
a dummy indicating that Inc Reg is equal 0 and a dummy indicating that State Control is equal 0; “Cash Flows *Inc*State” 
refers to the interaction term between Cash Flows, a dummy indicating that Inc Reg is equal 1 and a dummy indicating that 
State Control is equal 1; “Cash Flows *Inc*Private” refers to the interaction term between Cash Flows, a dummy indicating 
that Inc Reg is equal 1 and a dummy indicating that State Control is equal 0; “Cash Flows * Cost *Private” refers to the 
interaction term between Cash Flows, a dummy indicating that Inc Reg is equal 0 and a dummy indicating that State Control 
is equal 0;  Note that year dummies were included in all presented specifications. 
 
 
 
Table A6a: Smoothing (S), Impact (I) and Target Payout Ratio (Tpr) - Cash Flows 
 
 GMM GMM(extern) 
 State Private State Private 
 Inc Cost Inc Cost Inc Cost Inc Cost 
S 0.547*** 0.348*** - 0.172 0.577*** 0.343*** - 0.104 
I 0.184*** 0.106*** 0.327*** 0.243*** 0.171*** 0.106*** 0.342*** 0.265*** 
Tpr 0.405*** 0.162*** 0.313*** 0.294*** 0.404*** 0.161*** 0.320*** 0.296*** 
 
 GMM(few_inst) 
 State Private 
 Inc Cost Inc Cost 
S 0.500* 0.541*** - 0.236 
I 0.220* 0.0708** 0.342*** 0.255*** 
Tpr 0.441*** 0.154*** 0.316*** 0.333*** 
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Table A7: Incentive vs Cost-Based Regulation - Analysis by sub-sampling 
 
Dep. Var.: Dividends t OLS FE GMM 
 Inc Cost Inc Cost Inc Cost 
       
Dividends t-1 0.303 0.644*** 0.0558 0.610*** 0.446* 0.761*** 
 (0.181) (0.0967) (0.101) (0.0917) (0.268) (0.123) 
       
Net Profits t-3 0.403*** 0.234*** 0.285*** 0.233*** 0.377*** 0.115* 
 (0.0657) (0.0435) (0.0458) (0.0523) (0.135) (0.0592) 
Instruments 1st difference equation      
Standard       
GMM-type     Dividends t-3 
Net Profits t-3 
Dividends t-3 
Net Profits t-2 
Instruments level equation      
Standard     Constant Constant 
GMM-type     Dividends t-2 
Net Profits t-2 
Dividends t-2 
Net Profits t-2 
N.Firms [N. Obs.] 65 [443] 85 [974] 65 [443] 85 [974] 65 [443] 85 [974] 
R2 0.678 0.819 0.304 0.756   
adj. R2 0.661 0.815 0.267 0.749   
AIC 12933.0 27025.6 12831.9 26979.5 . . 
sarganp     0.000 0.000 
hansenp     0.813 0.480 
ar1p     0.0252 0.160 
ar2p     0.246 0.804 
j     72 93 
Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01; hansenp represents the p-value of the Hansen test of overid. 
restrictions; sarganp represents the p-value of the Sargan test of overid. restrictions; ar1p and ar2p represent the p-values of 
the autocorrelation tests of order 1 and 2 respectively; “Inc” refers to incentive regulation and “RoR” to RoR regulation; Note 
that year dummies were included in all presented specifications. 
 
 
 
Table A7a: Smoothing (S), Impact (I) and Target Payout (Tpr) using Net Profits 
 
 OLS FE GMM 
 Inc Cost Inc Cost Inc Cost 
S 0.303 0.644*** 0.0558 0.610*** 0.446* 0.761*** 
I 0.403*** 0.234*** 0.285*** 0.233*** 0.377*** 0.115* 
Tpr 0.578*** 0.656*** 0.302*** 0.599*** 0.681*** 0.480* 
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Table A8: Incentive vs Cost-Based Regulation - Analysis by sub-sampling - Cash Flows 
 
Dep. Var.: Dividends t OLS FE GMM 
 Inc Cost Inc Cost Inc Cost 
       
Dividends t-1 0.190 0.732*** 0.0739 0.489*** 0.278 0.667*** 
 (0.170) (0.0908) (0.125) (0.0967) (0.254) (0.153) 
       
Cash Flows 0.286*** 0.0867*** 0.217*** 0.200*** 0.284*** 0.0840*** 
 (0.0489) (0.0241) (0.0556) (0.0326) (0.0845) (0.0304) 
Instruments 1st difference equation      
Standard       
GMM-type     Dividends t-3 
Cash Flows t-3 
Dividends t-3 
Cash Flows t-2 
Instruments level equation      
Standard     Constant Constant 
GMM-type     Dividends t-2 
Cash Flows t-2 
Dividends t-2 
Cash Flows t-2 
N 65 [443] 85 [970] 65 [443] 85 [970] 65 [443] 85 [970] 
R2 0.709 0.804 0.300 0.772   
adj. R2 0.694 0.799 0.263 0.766   
AIC 12887.9 26996.7 12834.3 26806.9 . . 
Sarganp     0.00160 1.97e-34 
Hansenp     0.850 0.512 
ar1p     0.0281 0.162 
ar2p     0.306 0.971 
J     72 93 
Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01; hansenp represents the p-value of the Hansen test of overid. 
restrictions; sarganp represents the p-value of the Sargan test of overid. restrictions; ar1p and ar2p represent the p-values of 
the autocorrelation tests of order 1 and 2 respectively; “Inc” refers to incentive regulation and “RoR” to RoR regulation; Note 
that year dummies were included in all presented specifications. 
 
 
 
Table A8a: Smoothing (S), Impact (I) and Target Payout Ratio (Tpr) 
 
 OLS FE GMM 
 Inc Cost Inc Cost Inc Cost 
S 0.190 0.732*** 0.0739 0.489*** 0.278 0.667*** 
I 0.286*** 0.0867*** 0.217*** 0.200*** 0.284*** 0.0840*** 
Tpr 0.353*** 0.324*** 0.235*** 0.391*** 0.393*** 0.252*** 
 
 
 
 
